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I.

ABSTRACT

Participants in the NFL gambling market can largely be divided into two distinct groups:
informed bettors (“Sharps”) and uninformed bettors (“Squares”). Empirical and anecdotal
evidence suggest that the dynamic between Sharp and Square bettors is very similar to
that between institutional and retail investors. Professionals tend to be far better informed
and utilize rational betting/investing strategies while individuals exhibit biases which
perpetuate irrational strategies and therefore pricing inefficiencies. This study finds that
uninformed participants in financial markets and the NFL betting market do share similar
biases, and that these biases can be exploited by informed participants to generate
positive excess returns. The ability of Sharp bettors to generate excess returns, much like
professional investors, is well covered in academic research. This study adds to the
existing literature by analyzing whether “Follower” bettors can achieve statistically
significant excess returns and higher than expected winning percentages by identifying
reverse line movements and imitating the bets of Sharp gamblers.
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III.

MOTIVATION
George Soros is famous for his theory of reflexivity, which has served as the

foundation for his legendary investing strategy for more than three decades. He believes
that market participants are inherently biased, which creates pricing inefficiencies that
can be taken advantage of by the unbiased and informed investor (Soros 88). Investing
strategies based upon the exploitation of inherent investor biases have been the subject of
much debate in the academic circle due to their stark contrast to the efficient market
hypothesis. This hypothesis is commonly referred to as the “noise trader” theory.
The noise trader theory posits that irrational investors are making decisions based
upon uninformed “pseudosignals” which creates an opportunity for rational traders to
arbitrage the pricing inefficiency. Generally speaking, the bulk of uninformed market
participants are individual investors while institutional investors comprise their informed
counterparts (Lee et al. 1990).
Central to the noise trader theory is the concept that uninformed investors trade
based upon sentiment rather than prudent information. In order to test whether individual
investors trade based upon sentiment, academics commonly study closed-end mutual
funds. Such funds provide an excellent testing ground as they tend to be held primarily by
individuals (Lee et al. 1990). The closed end structure of these funds allows academics to
study the premium or discount at which these funds trade relative to their underlying net
asset value. The theory is that fluctuations in the level of premium or discount indicate
irrational buying or selling pressure from individual investors (Lee et al. 1991). Rational
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investors arbitrage away these pricing inefficiencies until costs such as commissions
eliminate the remaining profit opportunity (Pontiff 1996).
Two specific biases which academic studies have identified in individual
investors include overreaction to recent information regarding a security and the tendency
to buy “attention-grabbing” stocks. The overreaction theory purports that individual
investors value recent information too highly and drive stocks above or below their
intrinsic value. In support of this, Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that portfolios
comprised of stocks in the bottom decile of performance tend to outperform their winning
counterparts over the next three years. A similar study by Chopra et al. (1992) also found
that this contrarian investing strategy can generate statistically significantly positive
returns for informed investors.
The second bias which irrational investors exhibit is a preference to purchase
stocks which are highly visible. Barber and Odean (2007) found that “individual
investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks
experiencing high abnormal trading volume, and stocks with extreme one-day returns.”
The study does not investigate the viability of a contrarian strategy that identifies and
sells “attention-grabbing” stocks, but does find the purchase of such securities by
individual investors to be irrational and unprofitable. This result is profound as it could
indicate greater short-term pricing inefficiency in stocks that receive abnormally high
attention.
Institutional investors do not exhibit the same sentiment and biases that most
individual investors do. Barber and Odean contrast their findings regarding individual
5

investors with evidence that professional investors “are likely to employ explicit purchase
criteria—perhaps implemented with computer algorithms—that circumvent attentiondriven buying.” Feng and Seaholes (2005) reached a similar conclusion that experienced
investors such as institutions tend to be less biased. The effect of institutional investors
rationality is that stocks with greater institutional ownership are more efficiently priced
(Boehmer and Kelley 2009).
Institutional investors’ superior access to information, combined with their
awareness of individual investor bias, allows them to achieve highly profitable trading
strategies (Nofsinger and Sias 1999). A specific example of this is the ability of
institutions to predict earnings breaks at least one quarter in advance of the break quarter.
Evidence suggests that this is made possible by “obtaining information regarding the
impending break from private communications with management” (Ke and Petroni
2004). Such communications provide a clear advantage over individual investors.
All of these studies indicate that institutional investors are superior to individual
investors in their lack of bias as well as greater access to information. The question then
becomes, however, whether non-institutional investors who are aware of these inherent
discrepancies, can mimic the investing strategies of institutions and generate positive
excess returns. While most strategies employed by large institutions are too complex or
require too much capital to be replicated by individual investors, there are instances in
which a “copycat” strategy appears to be profitable. One example of this is individual
investors who attempt to imitate the holdings of Warren Buffett’s legendary Berkshire
Hathaway. Because Berkshire’s holdings records are released on a monthly basis, it is not
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difficult to create a portfolio comprised of their public investments. Martin and
Puthenpurackal (2008) found that such a strategy can yield statistically significant excess
returns.
Greater access to information and lack of bias have been shown to render
institutional investors superior at generating returns compared to individual investors in
the financial markets. In this paper, I will study whether uniformed participants in a
different market—the NFL gambling market—exhibit similar biases and whether they
can also be exploited by their informed counterparts. Furthermore, I will test whether
individuals who are aware of retail gambler biases and the superior information possessed
by professional gamblers can utilize reverse line movements to mimic bets placed by
professionals and generate excess returns.

IV.

IMPORTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF THE NFL GAMBLING MARKET
One must look no further than the record $119 million wagered in Nevada casinos

on the 2014 Super Bowl to understand the magnitude of sports gambling in the United
States. The Nevada Gaming Control Board reports that legal gambling action on the
Super Bowl has increased every year over the past five seasons, and some experts
estimate that as little as 1 percent of bets placed on the big game are done so legally
(NGCB 2014) (Hairopoulos 2011). The rest are wagered anywhere from black market
betting rings to office pools, and when it’s all said and done roughly half of all
Americans have a stake in the game (Hairopoulos 2011).
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These tremendous figures are not limited to the Super Bowl. According to
revenue estimates from the Nevada Gaming Control board, approximately $3 billion was
wagered on sports in Nevada in 2013 with a similarly huge percentage likely being
gambled illegally (NGCB 2014). 1 Similar to financial markets, participants in the NFL
betting market range from casual sports fans basing their picks on intuition and very
limited research, to professional betting syndicates with millions of dollars and complex
computer prediction systems at their disposal. Conventional wisdom dictates that
professional gamblers, commonly referred to as “Sharps,” enjoy a significant
informational advantage over retail gamblers. Much like individual investors, retail
gamblers (otherwise known as “Squares”), are thought to be highly biased in their betting
decisions which creates inefficiencies for Sharps and sports books to exploit (Rodney and
Weinbach 2010).
Furthermore, academic studies have found that by exploiting these biases, Sharps
are able to achieve positive excess returns (Miller and Rapach 2013). Given these
findings, it is intuitive that individuals mimicking Sharp bettors could also achieve
significant profits. While the strategies of most Sharps are closely guarded secrets, some
bettors believe that it is possible to ascertain where the “smart money” is being wagered
by observing how the spread on the game changes over time.
The specific strategy which I will explore in this paper uses reverse line
movements to identify teams that Sharps are betting on. I will test whether non-Sharps,
who I will refer to as “Followers,” can then win more than the expected 50 percent of
1

Calculated based on $136 million in net revenue and standard 4.5% commission rate on total wagers
placed

8

wagers and earn statistically significant positive returns by betting on the same side as the
professionals. While some bettors have sworn by this strategy for years, to my knowledge
it has not yet been studied in academic literature. I will explain more about the theory
behind and execution of the reverse line movement strategy in section IV of this paper.
My findings provide evidence that bettors using variations of the reverse line
movement strategy are able to achieve win rates that are statistically significantly higher
than the expected 50 percent level and that they can earn positive excess returns,
especially in the absence of commission costs.
These results, along with existing research on NFL betting, indicate that the
market is governed by similar biases to those that exist in financial markets. Square
bettors appear to have similar biases to those observed in individual investors, while
Sharp bettors take advantage of these biases through comparable contrarian strategies to
those used by institutional investors.

V.

UNDERSTANDING THE POINT SPREAD
The sports gambling industry was revolutionized in the 1940s when legendary

sports handicapper Charles K. McNeil invented the point spread method of book making
(Boyle 1986). Book makers had previously offered only odds that a team would win
outright (e.g. 4-to-1 that Green Bay would beat Chicago) which is the same way that
baseball gambling works today. Under McNeil’s system, however, bettors would wager
on how many points a team would win or lose by. For example, the Chicago Bears would
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be offered at -10 (10 point favorites) over the Green Bay Packers. Bettors taking Chicago
would need the Bears to win by more than 10 points while bettors wagering on Green
Bay would need the Packers to lose by less than 10 points or win outright. A 10 point
Chicago victory would result in a “push” in which both sides of the wager would have
their money returned in its entirety. The 10 points by which the Bears are favored is
referred to as the “spread” or “betting line” and the winning side of a spread bet is said to
have “won against the spread” or “covered the spread.” The point spread system which
McNeil introduced remains the most popular method of gambling on football and
basketball games of all levels and is often credited as a primary reason for the explosive
growth of the sports betting markets.
Empirical evidence shows that spreads offered by sports books are very accurate
predictors of actual game outcomes and that it is very difficult to achieve win rates
greater than the expected 50 percent level (Sauer et al. 1988). Compounding this, bettors
must contend with the commission which sports books charge for their services. Also
known as the “vigorish,” “vig,” or “juice,” sports books typically follow the standard 10for-11 payout structure. This means that the book collects the entirety of all losing bets
while only paying out $10 for every $11 wagered on the winning side. This implies a
juice of 4.55% on the total amount bet. In theory, if the book follows this standard and
consistently balances their book (an equal amount of money being bet on the favorite and
the underdog), they will earn a risk-free return of 4.55% on all money wagered.
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VI.

THEORY
A key attribute of the point spread is that sports books have the ability to change it

over time as more information becomes available and bettor preferences become
apparent. The books will typically post an “opening line” on Monday or Tuesday of
every week for the NFL games played on the following weekend. Throughout the week,
however, they will change the line based on information such as injury reports and bettor
action.
This gives the books a certain degree of control over how much action both sides
of a bet receive. If more money is being placed on Chicago at -10 than the sports book
wants, they can raise the line to -10.5 or -11 in order to make a bet on Green Bay more
attractive. Changes in the line throughout the course of the week are quite common. The
data set used in this paper shows that the line changed from the open to the close in 76%
of games played in the NFL since 2003. Similar frequencies of line changes have been
documented in the NBA (Gander, Dare, et al. 1998). Line changes over the course of the
week are documented by sports books and this information is easily accessible to bettors
on numerous websites such as VegasInsider.com.
Also documented on these websites is the percent of bets being placed on both
teams in a given matchup (but not the total dollars bet). Coupling this with the line
movements and the assumption that sports books want to balance the notional amount bet
on each side of the matchup is quite informative. Assuming that books are balanced and
that every bet placed is of equal dollar value, logic would dictate that if more than 50
percent of bets are being placed on a given team, the book would move the line against
11

them (bigger favorite or smaller underdog) in order to encourage more action on the other
side. To again use the example of Chicago versus Green Bay, this would mean that if 70
percent of bets are being placed on the Bears at -10, then we would expect the book to
make them -10.5 or -11 point favorites. The Packers then become increasingly attractive
at +10.5 or +11 point underdogs and the book should approach a relative level of parity
on both sides. The line will in theory move until it is at the market clearing level.
Empirical evidence, however, shows that lines will sometimes not move in this
expected manner. Rather, the line will move to Chicago -9.5 or -9, which is in complete
contrast to our above example. Such a change in the spread is referred to as a “reverse
line movement” and indicates that our assumption of balanced books, equal sized bets, or
both are invalid. The theory surrounding these line movements is that they are caused by
Sharps betting heavily on one side of the line (the Packers in this example). If one
operates under the assumption of balanced sports books, the occurrence of reverse line
movements means that Sharps are placing much larger bets than Squares.
On the other hand, if one assumes that all bets are of equal dollar amount, then
reverse line movements indicate that the books value the insight bettors taking the
Packers significantly more than that of those betting on the Bears. This means that sports
books are taking on a risk position that stands to profit if the Packers cover the spread and
to lose if the Bears do so. In fact, sports books taking proprietary positions on games is
well documented in academic research (Humphreys 2011) (Levitt 2004).
Ultimately, logic as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that because Sharps are
more informed, the bets they place are larger in size and sports books highly value their
12

insight. Perhaps the clearest example of a prolific sports gambler whose bets can single
handedly move sports lines is that of Billy Walters. Walters is a legendary sports
handicapper who has amassed an estimated $200 million fortune, largely from his
football and basketball betting operations. He began his career in sports gambling as an
illegal book maker in Kentucky and eventually moved to Las Vegas in the 1980s where
he became part of one of the first computer betting syndicates (Berzon 2014). Today he is
considered to be one of the most notorious sports gamblers of all time and is described by
his peers as “brilliant,” “respected,” and “feared”.
Walters uses a team of analysts to scour for information on injuries, weather, and
statistics which he inputs into an advanced computer system in order to gain an edge over
the sports books and the betting public. His systems generate a predicted spread for each
game, and the larger the discrepancy between Walters’ predictions and the casino sports
lines, the more he will bet. On any given Sunday during the NFL season, Walters will
have an average of $2 million at risk—clearly orders of magnitude more than virtually
any retail gambler. On the 2010 Super Bowl alone, he famously won $3.5 million. His
track record speaks for itself as he claims to have never had a losing year in a career that
spans more than three decades (CBS News 2011). This unprecedented level of success
has certainly drawn the attention of sports books over the years. In a rare 60 Minutes
piece documenting Walters’ career, CEO of CG Technology Lee Amaitis was asked if
Walters has the ability to move betting lines. CG Technology manages multiple sports
books across Las Vegas. Amaitis responded, “of course he does…he’s Billy Walters…of
course he has the ability to move our lines.” Amaitis went on to say that it is an
advantage to know what Walters is thinking (CBS News 2011).
13

An interesting comparison to be made is to that of George Soros famously
speculating on the British pound sterling in 1992. Recognizing that the UK currency had
entered into the Exchange Rate Mechanism at too high of a rate, Soros sold short $10
billion in pound sterling. The downward pressure which this exerted on the pound
sterling forced the Bank of England to secede from the ERM and devalue the currency.
Much like Walters, Soros recognized an artificially inflated asset and utilized his brute
force as an investing behemoth to correct the valuation and profit from the inefficiency.
By deflating the pound sterling, Soros earned an estimated $1 billion and the moniker of
“the man who broke the Bank of England” (Litterick 2002).
While it is true that Billy Walters, much like George Soros, is the Sharpest in his
field, he serves as proof of both the influence which Sharp gamblers have over betting
lines and the large size of bets which Sharps are consistently placing. This strongly
supports the theory that reverse line movements can indicate which side the smart money
is flowing to. Bettors privy to this phenomenon have believed for years that they could
gain an advantage by following the lead of line-moving Sharps. Due to lack of historical
data on public betting percentages, however, the effectiveness of such a strategy has yet
to be studied by academics.
Much like in financial markets, the advantage of professional gamblers is
enhanced by noise created by retail gamblers. This noise skews lines in the direction of
Square bias. A relatively well know example is that Squares tend to be biased towards
favorites (Levitt 2004). In the data set used in this paper, approximately 80% of bets
placed from 2003-2014 were on the favored team. Humphreys (2011) reached a similar

14

result. Knowing this, it stands to reason that an unbiased bettor could bet on the underdog
at an inflated line and achieve positive returns (at least before commissions are
considered). Indeed, academic studies have shown that variations of the underdog
strategy can be profitable (Wever and Aadland 2011).
Biases such as this create profit opportunities for Sharps as well as the sports
books themselves. As stated earlier, it is not uncommon for sports books to take positions
on games rather than balance their books. If they believe that Square bettors will be
biased toward a particular team, the book has the ability to set the spread at a level which
is different from the efficient level. Humphreys (2011) found that “sports books
consistently take positions on games, and that these positions are mostly on the
underdog” (64). To use the Super Bowl as an example, in 2014 Las Vegas casinos earned
a return of 16.5% by taking a proprietary position on the underdog Seattle Seahawks.
This return is significantly more than the 4.6% expected under the balanced book
assumption (NGCB 2014). Because of their bias, squares will still buy the line even
though the odds are stacked in favor of the book. Gandar et al. (1998) used evidence from
the NBA betting market to show that sports books base their opening spreads not just on
their predicted outcome for the game, but also on their “perception of the betting
market’s evaluation of these outcomes” (387).
Much like the dynamic witnessed in closed-end funds, informed bettors tend to
arbitrage away the inefficiencies created by the biased Square bettors until costs of
arbitrage such as commissions eliminate the potential for further profit (Lee et al. 1990).
Reverse line movements are the manifestation of this arbitrage activity. Lee et al. further
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found that closed-end funds tend to be issued at premiums to their net asset values, and
then revert to a discount within several months of the issue due to arbitrage. They
attribute this phenomenon to overoptimistic investor sentiment, which is often caused by
famous portfolio managers running the funds or the promise of innovative investment
strategies. In a later paper, Lee et al. (1991) stated these findings more bluntly by alleging
that “like casinos and snake oil, closed-end funds are a device by which smart
entrepreneurs take advantage of a less sophisticated public” (84).

VII.

DATA
To perform my analysis of the profitability of gambling strategies based on

reverse line movements, I used a sample of NFL betting data from SportsInsights.com.
The data set spans 2,967 games from 2003-2014 and includes information such as
opening lines, closing lines, and recent performance of both teams in every matchup.
These data points are not necessarily uncommon, but the unique aspect of this data set is
that it also includes the public betting percentages for each matchup, therefore making it
possible to identify reverse line movements. Sports Insights compiled the information
from four highly reputable online sports books: Pinnacle, 5Dimes, BetUS, and GT Bets.
To analyze whether Followers can profit from identifying reverse line movements
and taking the same side as Sharp bettors, I tested both winning percentage and expected
return. I chose to test three specific strategies, all of which were predicated upon reverse
line movements. I began with a strategy of simply betting on all games that experienced
reverse line movements. In this strategy, Followers bet on teams that are receiving less
16

than 40 percent of the total bets placed, but have had the spread move against them
(became bigger favorites or smaller underdogs).
Additionally, I tested two variations of the reverse line movement strategy which
fit the aforementioned criteria and also utilized one additional filter when selecting teams
to bet on. The first of these strategies focused exclusively on games played between two
opponents in the same Conference that also experienced a reverse line movement. The
purpose of only betting on In-Conference games is that they tend to attract more action
from retail gamblers. For context, the NFL is divided evenly into two Conferences: the
American Football Conference (AFC) and the National Football Conference (NFC).
Because playoff berths are determined separately within the AFC and NFC, games
between conference opponents tend to have more playoff implications and therefore
receive more attention from retail gamblers. The theory underlying this strategy is
directly related to the findings of individual investor bias toward “attention-grabbing”
stocks.
To test whether this theory held true in my data set, I utilized a filter available on
Sports Insights which tracks number of bets on every game relative to the average bets
per game on that day. Of games that received higher than average betting action since
2003, 76 percent of those games were played between conference opponents. Because
total number of bets placed on games relative to the day’s average is a retrospective
measure, it cannot be used for as part of a real-time betting strategy. With such a high
percentage of these games being In-Conference matchups, however, betting on InConference games serves as a reasonable proxy. With increased participation from retail
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gamblers, the effect of their biases should be amplified and therefore inefficiencies
increased. A 2004 study of NFL gambling by Levitt supports this theory as he found that
“the dispersion of the fraction of wagers placed on the preferred team is actually greater
in the games with more total bets” (231).
The final strategy which I tested was betting on teams that have performed very
poorly in the two weeks prior to a game where a reverse line movement occurred, with
poor performance being defined as losing by at least 10 points against the spread. This
strategy takes advantage of Square bias against the poor performer by betting on the
artificially inflated line (Gray and Gray 1997) (Sinkey and Logan 2012). The inspiration
for this strategy came from the overreaction theory in financial markets which causes
contrarian portfolios of prior losers to generate excess returns.
I tested both the observed win percentage and excess returns of each of these
strategies for statistical significance. For win percentage, I used Pearson’s Chi-Square to
determine whether the strategies achieved win percentages greater than the expected 50
percent level in this sample. An obvious question to be raised here is whether the
expected win percentage should actually be 50 percent given the possibility of “pushes.”
Because it is not possible to attain a theoretical value for the expected frequency of
pushing (which would be required for the Chi-Square test), I excluded games that
resulted in a push for this test. Once pushes have been omitted, the expected win
percentage is necessarily 50 percent. Additionally, I tested the consistency of each
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strategy by breaking the sample up into two periods of 2003-2008 and 2009-2014 and
found the z-score for the difference in winning percentages within the two sub-periods. 2
To test the significance of the excess returns generated by each strategy I
performed a two-tail t-test of the average return per bet to test whether it was different
from the expected 0 percent level. I included games that resulted in a push because a
theoretical push percentage is not necessary for this test. Additionally, I calculated the tstatistic associated with the expected return per bet both before and after accounting for
the juice in order to assess the effect of sports book commissions on otherwise potentially
winning strategies. Also of note is that the actual payouts of winning bets in this sample
are higher on average than the 10-for-11 rule would dictate. This is because the payout
data came from Pinnacle, which is a “reduced juice” sports book. I tested the significance
of the returns under the reduced juice payout structure as well. The equation for
calculating the expected return is as follows3:
𝑟𝑒 = (𝑟𝑤 × 𝑝𝑤 ) + (𝑟𝑙 × 𝑝𝑙 )

Finally, I calculated the realized annual in-sample return of each strategy using
the Kelly Criterion for optimal bet size . 4 For all of the strategies studied, I assumed that
the Followers were placing their bets on the closing line.

2

3

𝑧=

(𝑝̅1 −𝑝̅2 )
1

1

�𝑝̅ (1−𝑝̅ )�𝑛 +𝑛 �
1
1

rw and rl are the payouts of winning and losing bets, respectively; pw and pl are the probability of winning
and losing, respectively
4
The Kelly betting criterion is a formula which gamblers use to determine their optimal bet size. It is most
commonly used in Blackjack gambling, but is applicable in this situation as well. In these tests I used a
shrinkage factor of 0.5 in order to account for parameter uncertainty, as suggested by Baker and McHale
(2013).
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VIII. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Standard Reverse Line Movement Strategy:
Pearson Chi-Square
Sample Win %
Expected Win %
Observations
Observed Frequency
Expected Frequency

Chi-Square

Return Significance
Return Significance
(No Juice)
(Standard Juice)
53.1% Sample Win %
52.1% Sample Win %
50.0% Sample Push %
1.8% Sample Push %
642 Sample Lose %
46.0% Sample Lose %
341 Winner Payout
1.00 Winner Payout
321 Push Payout
0.00 Push Payout
Loser Payout
-1.00 Loser Payout
Expected Return
6.1% Expected Return
Standard Deviation
99.0% Standard Deviation
Observations
654 Observations
Standard Error
3.9% Standard Error
1.246 T Stat
1.580 T Stat

Return Significance
(Reduced Juice)
52.1% Sample Win %
52.1%
1.8% Sample Push %
1.8%
46.0% Sample Lose %
46.0%
0.91 Winner Payout
0.95
0.00 Push Payout
0.00
-1.00 Loser Payout
-1.00
1.38% Expected Return
3.4%
94.5% Standard Deviation
96.5%
654 Observations
654
3.7% Standard Error
3.8%
0.373 T Stat
0.902

This strategy produced a winning percentage (omitting pushes) of 53.1% over the
12 season sample period. This winning percentage was not significant at the 10 percent
level using Pearson’s Chi-Square test. Once pushes were included the winning percentage
fell to 52.1% and the t-statistic of 1.58 approached significance at the 10 percent level
before juice was accounted for.
Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of sports book juice had a hugely negative impact
on the profitability of the betting strategy. The expected return per bet falls from 6.1%
without juice to just 1.4% under the standard 4.6% juice assumption. Under the reduced
juice structure, the returns are increased to 3.4%, but are still relatively far from statistical
significance. A bettor utilizing this strategy over the past 12 NFL seasons using a reduced
juice sports book would have achieved an annual return on investment of 7.9%.
If the sample is broken up into six year sub-periods, the winning percentage of the
strategy does not differ across them. This indicates persistence of the strategy over time.
The win percentages in the two sub-periods and z-score of the difference is as follows:
20

2003-2008

2009-2014

Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Difference (Z-Score)

53.0%
279
0.52
53.2%
363
0.73
-0.031

The remaining two strategies were intended to boost returns by isolating
situations in which pricing inefficiencies created by individual investor bias would be
larger.
Reverse Line Movements in In-Conference Games:
Pearson Chi-Square
Win %
Expected Win %
Observations
Observed Frequency
Expected Frequency

Chi-Square

Return Significance
(No Juice)
54.7% Sample Win %
50.0% Sample Push %
481 Sample Lose %
263 Winner Payout
240.5 Push Payout
Loser Payout
Expected Return
Standard Deviation
Observations
Standard Error
2.105 T Stat

Return Significance
Return Significance
(Standard Juice)
(Reduced Juice)
53.8% Sample Win %
53.8%
53.8% Sample Win %
1.6%
1.6% Sample Push %
1.6% Sample Push %
44.6% Sample Lose %
44.6% Sample Lose %
44.6%
0.95
1.00 Winner Payout
0.91 Winner Payout
0.00
0.00 Push Payout
0.00 Push Payout
-1.00
-1.00 Loser Payout
-1.00 Loser Payout
9.2% Expected Return
4.3% Expected Return
6.4%
98.9% Standard Deviation
96.4%
94.4% Standard Deviation
489
489 Observations
489 Observations
4.5% Standard Error
4.3% Standard Error
4.4%
2.059 T Stat
1.011 T Stat
1.464

The results of these tests support my hypothesis of greater opportunity for profit
by focusing on games with higher Square better participation. The Chi-Square statistic is
approaching significance at the 10 percent level and returns are significant at the 5
percent level before juice is considered. Over the past 12 years this strategy achieved an
annual return of 22.2% assuming reduced juice.
Once juice is accounted for, the returns are not significantly different from 0
percent at any conventional level using a two-tailed test. Returns when betting on a
reduced juice book, however, are approaching statistical significance.
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2003-2008

2009-2014

Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Difference (Z-Score)

55.1%
216
1.12
54.3%
265
1.00
0.165

Again, the win percentages achieved in the sub-periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2014
do not differ from one another, indicating consistency in the strategy.
Reverse Line Movements on Recent Poor Performers:
Pearson Chi-Square
Win %
Expected Win %
Observations
Observed Frequency
Expected Frequency

Chi-Square

Return Significance
(No Juice)
60.7% Sample Win %
50.0% Sample Push %
122 Sample Lose %
74 Winner Payout
61 Push Payout
Loser Payout
Expected Return
Standard Deviation
Observations
Standard Error
2.770 T Stat

Return Significance
(Standard Juice)
59.2% Sample Win %
2.4% Sample Push %
38.4% Sample Lose %
1.00 Winner Payout
0.00 Push Payout
-1.00 Loser Payout
20.8% Expected Return
97.0% Standard Deviation
125 Observations
8.7% Standard Error
2.398 T Stat

Return Significance
(Reduced Juice)
59.2% Sample Win %
2.4% Sample Push %
38.4% Sample Lose %
0.91 Winner Payout
0.00 Push Payout
-1.00 Loser Payout
15.4% Expected Return
92.5% Standard Deviation
125 Observations
8.3% Standard Error
1.863 T Stat

59.2%
2.4%
38.4%
0.95
0.00
-1.00
17.9%
94.8%
125
8.5%
2.116

Focusing on reverse line movements involving teams that have performed poorly
over their past two games proved to be the most successful strategy of the three over the
past eleven seasons. There is no data from 2003 because no games during that season fit
the strategy’s betting criteria. Winning percentage was significant at the 10 percent level
and returns excluding juice were significant at the 2 percent level. Furthermore, this was
the only test that exhibited statistically significant excess returns even when accounting
for sports book commissions as returns assuming standard juice and reduced juice were
significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. This betting strategy
yielded a 55.9% annual return from 2004-2014.
22

One problem with this strategy is that it appears to lack the same consistency as
the previous two:

2004-2008

2009-2014

Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Difference (Z-Score)

56.5%
62
0.52
65.0%
60
2.70
-0.966

The z-score is not exceptionally high due to the relatively small sample sizes, but
greater consistency would be desirable. To better understand where the inconsistency was
coming from, I further divided the sample into three sub-periods (although this rendered
the sample sizes very small):

2004-2006

2007-2010

2011-2014

Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square
Win %
Sample Size
Chi-Square

41.7%
24
0.33
69.2%
52
3.85
60.9%
46
1.09

These results clearly showed that the strategy exhibited considerable
underperformance during the 2004-2006 NFL seasons. While the cause of this is unclear,
it is possibly exaggerated by the very small sample size. With just one-fifth of the total
observations coming from this sub-period, it is possible that the results are skewed.
Furthermore, it is encouraging that the two most recent sub-periods have both exhibited
exceptionally strong performance, achieving win rates of over 60 percent. The cause of
the underperformance in the first sub-period is deserving of further research.
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IX.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The findings in this paper suggest that uninformed participants in financial

markets and the NFL betting market possess similar biases, and that these biases can be
exploited by informed participants to generate positive excess returns. The ability of
Sharp bettors to generate excess returns, much like professional investors, is well covered
in academic research. This study adds to this literature by analyzing whether “Follower”
bettors can imitate the bets of Sharps and achieve statistically significant excess returns
and higher than expected winning percentages.
I found that the reverse line movement strategy is most effective when focused on
games that are likely to exhibit higher levels of Square bettor bias. In-Conference games
draw more attention from retail gamblers due to their playoff implications, much in the
same way that individual investors are biased toward purchasing stocks covered
extensively by the media. My results indicate that focusing on these games increases
profitability, which indicates that spreads on these games are less efficient due to
increased Square participation.
Betting on teams that had recently performed poorly and also experienced a
reverse line movement proved to be the most profitable of the three strategies. The
inspiration for this strategy was the theory of uninformed individual investors
overreacting to recent news regarding a security, which renders contrarian investing
strategies profitable. My findings indicate that a contrarian strategy in NFL betting can
take advantage of a retail gambler bias to overreact to recent team performance.
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The downside of the reverse line movement strategy is that most of the
inefficiencies have already been arbitraged away by Sharp gamblers. This is consistent
with the first two strategies in this paper generating significant excess returns when
ignoring commission costs, but falling below statistically significant levels once juice is
accounted for.
It is true, however, that utilizing the reverse line movement strategy to bet on InConference games or bet on recent poor performers approaches or exceeds statistically
significant levels even after accounting for commissions. Levitt (2004) also found that
“competitive pressure does not appear to eliminate excess profits” in the same way that
one might expect given the ability of Sharp bettors to arbitrage. While I cannot provide
direct evidence of why profits seem to remain achievable for Followers, I can suggest
two possible explanations. The first is rather obvious in that sports book juice
significantly inhibits arbitrage by informed bettors. Therefore, lines are able to stabilize at
non-market clearing levels. This potentially allows for bettors on reduced juice sports
books to squeeze out extra returns that other might not be able to. The more likely
explanation is that sports books commonly impose bet size limits on Sharp gamblers in
order to protect themselves. These limits are likely still above the average bet size of
retail gamblers, but are low enough to inhibit the ability of Sharps to fully arbitrage the
biased spreads. Further research in this area could be quite enlightening.
It is also important to note that the strategies which I have outlined in this paper
could potentially be far more profitable than my findings indicate. In this paper I made
the rather pessimistic assumption that Followers were placing all of their bets on the
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closing line. In reality, there is nothing prohibiting Followers from placing bets as soon as
they identify a reverse line movement during the course of the week leading up to the
games. In theory, they could place the bets as soon as such a line movement occurs,
thereby securing a more favorable line before the arbitrage can fully occur. In fact, this
concept is commonly used in practice and is referred to by bettors as “chasing steam.”
Many gamblers regularly practice this strategy, but I never came across the topic in an
academic paper during my research. Parallels could likely be drawn between chasing
steam and high frequency traders front running institutional investors in financial
markets. Academic testing of this strategy is warranted.
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XI.

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Percent of Bets Placed on Favorites

Sample: 12 years of public betting percentages on NFL games. Data from Sports Insights.
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Figure 2: Super Bowl Betting Amounts
Sample: 10 years of legal Super Bowl betting amounts. Data from the Nevada Gaming
Control Board.
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Figure 3: Las Vegas Sports Books Super Bowl Profits
Sample: 10 years Las Vegas sports books profits as a percentage of total money wagered on
the Super Bowl. Data from the Nevada Gaming Control Board.
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2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Play
New England Patriots
New York Jets
Dallas Cowboys
Cincinnati Bengals
San Diego Chargers
Oakland Raiders
New York Giants
New Orleans Saints
Cleveland Browns
San Diego Chargers
Washington Redskins
Cleveland Browns
Houston Texans
San Diego Chargers
Philadelphia Eagles
Jacksonville Jaguars
Oakland Raiders
Houston Texans
New Orleans Saints
San Francisco 49ers
Detroit Lions
Buffalo Bills
Jacksonville Jaguars
Atlanta Falcons
San Francisco 49ers
New Orleans Saints
New York Giants
Chicago Bears
Jacksonville Jaguars
Arizona Cardinals
New York Giants
Jacksonville Jaguars
San Francisco 49ers
Chicago Bears
Arizona Cardinals
Cincinnati Bengals
Buffalo Bills

Home Team
Visitor Team
New England Patriots Tennessee Titans
New York Jets
Buffalo Bills
Dallas Cowboys
Philadelphia Eagles
Cincinnati Bengals
Baltimore Ravens
Cleveland Browns
San Diego Chargers
Oakland Raiders
Kansas City Chiefs
Minnesota Vikings
New York Giants
New Orleans Saints
Carolina Panthers
New England Patriots Cleveland Browns
Chicago Bears
San Diego Chargers
Washington Redskins Seattle Seahawks
Kansas City Chiefs
Cleveland Browns
Cincinnati Bengals
Houston Texans
San Diego Chargers
Minnesota Vikings
Green Bay Packers
Philadelphia Eagles
Tennessee Titans
Jacksonville Jaguars
Kansas City Chiefs
Oakland Raiders
Houston Texans
New England Patriots
Philadelphia Eagles
New Orleans Saints
Green Bay Packers
San Francisco 49ers
Detroit Lions
Green Bay Packers
Tennessee Titans
Buffalo Bills
New England Patriots Jacksonville Jaguars
Tampa Bay Buccaneers Atlanta Falcons
Philadelphia Eagles
San Francisco 49ers
New Orleans Saints
Dallas Cowboys
New York Giants
Carolina Panthers
Kansas City Chiefs
Chicago Bears
Atlanta Falcons
Jacksonville Jaguars
St. Louis Rams
Arizona Cardinals
Philadelphia Eagles
New York Giants
Buffalo Bills
Jacksonville Jaguars
San Francisco 49ers Atlanta Falcons
Green Bay Packers
Chicago Bears
Arizona Cardinals
New England Patriots
Cincinnati Bengals
Baltimore Ravens
Buffalo Bills
New England Patriots

Home Visitor >60% Team <40% Team Actual Closing Closing Line Reduced Juice Standard No Juice
Event Date Score Score
Score
Payout
Score
Spread Line
Result
Payout
Payout
10/5/2003 38
30
30
38
-8
0
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
10/12/2003 30
3
3
30
-27
0
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
10/12/2003 23
21
21
23
-2
-2
P
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
10/19/2003 34
26
26
34
-8
1
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
10/19/2003 20
26
20
26
-6
3.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
10/20/2003 10
17
17
10
7
3.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
10/26/2003 17
29
17
29
-12
5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
10/26/2003 20
23
23
20
3
-2.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
10/26/2003
9
3
9
3
6
4.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
11/2/2003 20
7
20
7
13
1.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
11/9/2003 27
20
20
27
-7
3
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
11/9/2003 41
20
41
20
21
9
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
11/9/2003 34
27
34
27
7
4
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
11/9/2003 42
28
28
42
-14
5.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
11/10/2003 14
17
14
17
-3
5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
11/16/2003 10
3
10
3
7
9.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
11/23/2003 27
24
27
24
3
11
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
11/23/2003 20
23
23
20
3
5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
11/23/2003 33
20
33
20
13
5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
11/23/2003 20
10
20
10
10
4
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
11/27/2003 22
14
14
22
-8
6.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
12/14/2003 28
26
28
26
2
5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
12/14/2003 27
13
27
13
14
6
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
12/20/2003 28
30
28
30
-2
6.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
12/21/2003 28
31
28
31
-3
7
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
12/28/2003 13
7
7
13
-6
0
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
12/28/2003 24
37
37
24
13
4.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
12/28/2003 31
3
31
3
28
7.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
12/28/2003 21
14
21
14
7
2.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
9/12/2004 17
10
17
10
7
10.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
9/12/2004 31
17
31
17
14
8
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
9/12/2004 10
13
10
13
-3
2.5
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
9/12/2004 19
21
21
19
2
3
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
9/19/2004 10
21
10
21
-11
8
1
92.6%
90.9%
100.0%
9/19/2004 12
23
23
12
11
7
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
9/26/2004
9
23
23
9
14
1.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%
10/3/2004 17
31
31
17
14
4.5
0
-100.0% -100.0% -100.0%

Table 1: Example of Data Structure
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